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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is twofold: (a) to bring on issues of asset impairment manipulation in the earning management 
context (b) to examine, any statistical inference validating impairment discretionary charges and firms’ earning experience. 
Problem statement: The Impairment accounting standard (IAS 36), enters new requirements for asset impairment provided to 
satisfying accrued loss amounts. Earning Management through the use of asset impairments within constrains of taking 
accounting process results to income manipulation representing a) an external demand to meet earnings forecasts b) internal 
demand for communicating board’ level performance. We expect to present a critical view of the earnings discretion and provide 
an answer on the prevailing content of asset impairment. The sample constituted of 26 Food and Beverage firms, listed in the 
Greek Stock Exchange Market on the basis of impairment observations. We analyze the earnings levels for two groups of 
companies, impairers and non- impairers in both 2005 and 2006 years. Results and Conclusion: Findings suggest (a) firms 
recording impairment charges possess lower earnings than do their counterparts not recording write downs and (b) the 
impairment losses are likely reported as timely opportunity to taking “big bath” and increasing future earnings.  However we 
estimate that Greek firms’ operating performance is engaged to earning adjustments on a) taxable environment and b) new 
accounting rules, than to liable income strategies 
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1. Introduction 
Impairment charges are valued as asset revaluation or estimations for future performance since Investors are 
trying to asses a firm’s value. Because on their infrequent status are often ambiguous in the information that convey. 
Since financial accounting reports include managers’ private information on their firm’s performance, judgments for 
potential benefits or costs (good or bad news) noise the information environment of asset reductions. Thus it is 
critical for standard setters to establish the reasonable degree of allowed discretion for valuable accounting 
information. Prior to issuance of IAS 36 no explicit guidance existed on accounting for the asset impairment. The 
[10], believe that the decisive demand for authoritative guidance on accounting for asset seems to be subject to 
management’ discretion for earning manipulation.  Voluntary disclosure information for recognizing write-downs 
accordingly to their timing and magnitude grounds substantial management manipulation. The use of different 
accounting treatments for asset write-downs resulted to incentives arranging transactions to take solely advantage of 
these differences. For these reasons and on the ground of the IFRS/U.S. GAAP convergence project, the IASB 
issued a new standard on Business Combinations (IFRS 3) in March 2004, with the revision of IAS 36 ‘Impairment 
of assets’. IAS 36 requires the recognition of an impairment loss whenever the asset’s carrying amount exceeds its 
recoverable amount. An asset’s recoverable amount is defined as the higher of its value in use (the present value of 
the future cash flows expected to be derived from the asset) an  its fair value less costs to sell (the amount obtainable 
from the sale of an asset in an arm’s length transaction between knowledgeable, willing parties, less the costs of 
disposal). The optional character of asset valuation IAS 36 provides a degree of freedom to firms drawing accounts 
better however undermines the coherence and reliability of the enactments [2]. Preparers of financial statements 
must make assumptions on estimating asset values and cash generating units especially regarding fair value 
accounting where raises many doubts. “Fair value accounting” could be strategically used by managers to adjust the 
timing and amounts of Impairment charges. IASB’ chairman David Tweedie (2004) acknowledges that beyond 
accounting standard pillar a proxy of enforcement mechanisms and audit need to improve financial reporting 
environment. According [22] the impact of IAS 36 on valuation equity models generated debate on impairment 
measurement accuracy since different motivations trigger alternative valuation models of impairment loss. 
Additionally there is a possibility of earnings management as investors can broaden   the timing of revaluations 
under the new impairment testing rules [19; 13]. At the same time the option of impairment test implementation can 
be cloaked by management incentives [4; 11]. Our paper contributes to the literature in at least two ways. First, we 
examine the impairment behavior on the Greek market. Models that were developed for the U.S and U.K market 
could have less validity in the Greek setting. Regarding the national background, Greek companies are affected by a 
long history of principles like conservatism (historical valuation) ,Creditor protection and “tax book conformity” 
The [23] so different accounting environment-policies affect  the impairment  approach. The remainder of this paper 
is organized as follows. In section two we will give an overview of the underlying accounting impairment 
regulations Section three we will provide the prior literature. In section four we describe our research design and the 
sample selection. Section five reports our results and conclusions. 
2. Background 
2.1. Accounting for impairments 
 
According to IAS 36, a company has to evaluate for all assets annually if a triggering event has occurred, except 
for those that are explicitly excluded from the scope. If this is the case an impairment test has to be carried on. 
Additionally, goodwill and intangible assets with an indefinite useful life have to be tested for impairment annually. 
Once an impairment test has to be managed, the carrying amount is compared with the recoverable amount, the 
latter being defined as the higher of fair value less costs to sell and value in use. The fair value less costs to sell has 
to be relied on an active market if this is possible. Alternatively, it can be calculated using a discounted cash flow 
approach. The value in use is defined as the present value of future cash flows. Discretion arises because in the vast 
majority of cases both value in use and fair value less cost to sell are counted on subjective estimates of either 
company internal or external cash flow predictions. Even though IAS 36 requires extensive disclosures on the 
parameters used to charge the impairment losses, however enough room being left for earnings management 
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regarding the impairment decision, especially in the case of  non-compliance with the disclosure requirements is 
taken into consideration [6]. This level of subjectivity is supported by [16], arguing  that the most important 
opportunities to manage earnings are in the area of cash flow projections. So the underlying assumptions need to be 
contested, amongst others internally and by the auditor, examining whether these assumptions are realistic. The 
existence of this level of subjectivity is also granted by [3,5]. Additionally corporate governance, economic trends 
and management entail possible incentives in favor of Impairment test choice [4,11]. Conditionally academics’ 
attention has to shift to disclosure quality requirements. 
2.2 Asset Impairment (Write-down) Event as component of Earnings Management 
The growing cogency of asset write-down is reflected in the financial press and by recent academic empirical 
research. Reuters web site article (27 Tue 2009) by Tom Freke and Quentin Webb, reports “Major European 
companies may be forced into writedowns totalling hundreds of billions of euros as they recognize the fallout from a 
1.8 trillion euro ($2.7 trillion) acquisition binge earlier this decade”  Studies look into write-downs, from different 
perspectives. The write-off literature focuses on four main areas, a) the effects of write-offs on returns, b) the 
relationship of earnings and write-downs, c) the impact of IAS 36 on write-downs announcements and d) the 
relations between the governance of a firm and the motivation to take write-downs as a business related decision. On 
the basis performance measure hypothesis management exploits earning tools in order to produce the more effective 
performance measure, timely related to earning goals. So regarding the write-offs, it is expected to reflect either 
declines in values or changes in management strategies and economic environment or to provide signal to investors 
for past problems dealt with. On the other hand the opportunistic management hides discretional incentives to 
developing techniques such as “big bath” to reduce the already depressed earnings and increasing future earnings 
and their bonuses. Under this setting, impairment asset decision can be hold as purposeful intervention of reporting 
income. 
3. Literature Review  
The Earnings Management encompasses structuring income numbers transactions in order to achieve (a) 
preferential earnings forecasts and increase share price and (b) internal managing ability to optimize company’s 
performance. Many studies classified as “income smoothing implying that a write-down is used to neutralize 
abnormal net income in order to create hidden reserves for later periods. The “big bath” is viewed to be a signal to 
investors that the balance sheet has been made “clean” of negative features that implies depressing future accounting 
returns. The [24] analyzed 77 cases of impairment accounting for 1978-1983, and found that most of them could be 
classified as a “big bath”, being the culmination of a period with low or negative net income. The [14] findings also 
support “big bath” theory, by analyzing 100 companies prior and after adoption of SFAS 142 for goodwill. However 
[21] found that, when controlling for industry sector, write-down companies were neither the best nor the worst 
performers in the years prior to the write-down. The [10] also do not provide strong evidences for the aspect that 
write-down companies are either “bathers” or “smoothers”. On the contrary, they find that indicators of asset 
impairment (e.g. book-to-market ratios) are important to explain write-downs. The [20] find that write-downs 
generally take place in years with low earnings (and therefore accentuate these), but find no statistically significant 
support for the hypothesis that management exploit impairment accounting to manipulate earnings. The [9] found 
that write-down companies earn less than non-write-down firms (adjusted for the write-down), both in absolute and 
relative terms, and that they are systematically larger and more highly leveraged than others.  
The [12] exploited a clinical study on Inco Ltd’s (nickel mining company) financial statement using market 
prices. They provided a detailed aspect on writedown discretionary decision, their findings strongly support that 
management opportunism remain strong under any new accounting standard and it serves mainly income 
performance. The [8] go little far studying the association asset impairment with negative earnings and industry 
factors. They found, economic factors and earnings management are strongly associated with reported impairment 
asset for loss and non-loss years but management’s incentive in loss years is stronger than non-loss years. Financial 
markets also seem to react to impairment decision according to [17] study in European listed companies (S&P 
Europe 350) for 2006-2007 years. Their findings document that market operators do not indifferent to impairment 
announcements. Impairment decision frequently associated with downward earnings since the managers having a 
bad profit year would presumably wish to recognize future cost by clearing the decks. Many firms strategically 
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make large write offs in order to start afresh.  There are important signaling implications in terms of semi-strong 
financial market efficiency regarding the information content of asset impairment [15]. Markets interpret an asset 
impairment announcement as negative signal on firm’s prospects mainly for distressed firms [7]. Analysts’ forecasts 
formulate investment strategies, [18] examined the writedown decision on Singapore firms where aggregative 
upward asset revaluation are permitted grading that frequent asset upwards implies frequent asset  writedowns. 
(positively related firm’s performance [1]).   
4. Research question- Methodology 
This study examines the impairment accounting under IAS 36 as a tool of manage earnings via “big bath” 
Impairments. IAS 36 leaves room for management interpretations and judgments offering another enticing reason 
for taking “big bath” impairments. So we investigate the significance of management’s influence on the value of 
impairment, accounted to applying of impairment test.  Consequently the research question cited as: 
 
Are impairment values being charged for earnings management tool? 
 
Our sample consists of all domestic Food and Beverage listed companies in ASE which prepared the 
consolidated financial statement under IFRS during the period 2005-2006. All data retrieved by annual reports. So 
by inspecting the annual reports we find a large variation in presentation of impairment account that requires 
individual judgment which is likely to narrow the credibility of used accounts. 
Earnings level for both groups were evaluated using three measures, return on assets (ROA) , return on sales 
(ROS) and return on equity (ROE) as the more common measures of earnings performance in international research 
area. Note that three measures are pre-tax based in operating income. 
5. Results and Conclusions 
 Table 1: Profitability levels of the Impairment and Non-Impairment firm groups 


























3.87% 4.98% .40 3.26% 4.95% .36 
Return on 
equity 
5.10 5.97% .57 4.98% 6.60% .37 
  Note:  Į=0.05 level is the significance level for the t-test between mean of Impairment and Non-Impairment firms 
 
Table 1 provides the mean ROA, ROE and ROS for 2005 and 2006 for both firm groups. Comparing earnings 
levels ROA differs significantly between Impairment and Non-Impairment group at 4.20% and 4.37% respectively, 
implying the presence of “big bath” earnings. The ROE reveals significant loss for impairment group for both years 
2005, 2006. Furthermore the Impairment firms experienced distressed earnings levels for 2005 year. The subsequent 
year of IAS 36 adoption 2006, represents a more fair view as Impairment firms realized significant reductions in 
earnings between 2005 and 2006 year.  Non-Impairment groups for 2006 year recorded higher performing levels at 
4.91% against to 4.07 of Impairment firms expressing that companies no longer enjoy operational earnings give rise 
to its asset impairment. The results above suggest that companies with earnings problems seem to be more prone to 
record impairments and further reduce their depressed earnings confirming also prior research findings. However 
statistical test do not strongly demonstrate a statistically reliable accounting opportunism against accounting 
efficiency. Considering a) the relative magnitude of various components incorporated into the impairment 
procedures b) the internal compensations systems associated with new mandatory accounting patterns and 
organizational re-structure c) the exogenous stressing linkage  between earning variables and tax conformity is 
founded extensive exploration for achieving reliable knowledge on impairment covenants.  The current study 
provides us with a useful proxy for expanding our research given ground to empirical explanations and income 
incentives. 
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